Many countries and states have been waking up to the need to enshrine the rights of animals and the environments in law. European countries in particular have been setting a trend in passing laws that recognize animal rights and introduce punishments for animal cruelty. What countries are passing these laws and what are the limitations?

Spain 

Spain has recently passed laws that increase punishments for animal mistreatment. Amongst other changes, it has also made training classes for dog owners mandatory and made it illegal to leave them for more than 24 hours. In 2020 Spain also passed laws that allowed for joint custody of animals in divorce, recognizing that companion animals were “sensitive, sentient beings” rather than property.

Switzerland

Switzerland is known for having animal rights laws that are stricter than other countries. The right to animal dignity is constitutionally protected. In 2022, Swiss people failed to vote for a law that would have banned industrial farming. 

Portugal 

In Portugal there is a law that criminalizes abuse and neglect of pets but it has faced challenges because animal protection is not enshrined in the Portuguese constitution.

Netherlands

The Netherlands may soon ban harmful breeding of pets. 

What are the Weaknesses of Animal Rights Laws?

One weakness in animal rights laws is who we choose to protect. This means that some animals are considered more worthy of protection than others, for example there are more laws to protect companion animals than lab animals. In the case of Spain’s new animal protection law, people have protested that the animal cruelty laws don’t protect hunting dogs and farm animals. The laws also don’t affect bullfighting, one of the cruelest “sports” involving animals. 

The manner in which animal protection laws are introduced often says a lot more about what is acceptable or normal for humans than it does about what animals need or deserve. It’s a positive thing that animal sentience is being recognized in divorce and pet custody. On the other hand, it’s easy for people to understand companion animals as an accessory to human existence. Meanwhile other animals like lab animals, farm animals and invertebrates are frequently under-protected in the law. Many other animals that don’t meet the definition of who humans consider to be intelligent or worth protecting aren’t legally protected. As laws to protect animal welfare proliferate, we need to locate the decision-making process within a new transhumanist framework in which our human perspective is de-centered and animals and ecosystems perspectives are at the center.

Giving animals, trees and rivers legal rights is no longer a fringe idea. The Law Society, the professional body for solicitors in England and Wales, has produced a report that says that granting legal rights and protections to non-human entities such as animals, trees and rivers is critical if nations are to confront climate collapse and the collapse of habitat and biodiversity.

The report is called Law in the Emerging Bio Age. The title indicates the big shift in thinking when it comes to humanity’s view of our place in our environment alongside other creatures. The idea that we live in the “bio age” is correct. Humans can no longer rely on the conceptual framework of the Western Christian tradition, in which we are outside nature and have dominion over nature. This attitude has brought us to the brink of the extinction of our species. It has destroyed whole species in the great age of extinction caused by pollution and human activity.

It’s time to move beyond the destructive power of exploitative traditions that inform our law and our societies. We can look to societies and nations that are informed by indigenous traditions for inspiration. Ecuador for example, has enshrined legal rights for the natural world, based on the tradition of respecting the earth mother goddess, Pachamama. Bolivia has also granted rights to nature. New Zealand has granted personhood to a former National Park, Te Urewara Park, the Whanganui river and Mt Taranaki.

In the West, in certain countries and states, the law has started to consider that animals should be defined as people rather than property in divorce cases.

These changes represent promising new seeds, but more has to be done to protect the vast swathes of the earth and its creatures that are vulnerable to human exploitation. It is time to accept that we live in the “bio age,” and time to build a new legal and political framework to legislate for our connectedness to natural and animal life.

Read More:

https://vjel.vermontlaw.edu/rights-nature-movement-closer-look-new-zealand#:~:text=Rather%20than%20incorporate%20a%20rights,Taranaki.

https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/oct/10/give-legal-rights-to-animals-trees-and-rivers-say-experts

Australia’s Capital Territory has just taken an important leap forward in the legal treatment of animals. The new laws in Australia’s Capital Territory recognize that animals can perceive and feel the world around them and have “intrinsic value.” These concepts finally depart from the legal structures which incarcerate animals as objects designed for humans’ use and abuse, and which characterize most legal systems around the world.

The laws impose sizeable fines and prison sentences for confining animals, lack of animal care and participating in cruelty to animals. They also move to restrict pet shops and the pet shop industry.
There is reason to celebrate the passing of these laws, but a good beginning mustn’t be a permanent band-aid. This article is right to point out that “animal sentience” does more to regulate treatment of pets than it does to change humans’ relationship with animals. Australian industries that harm animals won’t be expected to change. A “duty of care” is imposed on humans when they are in a relationship of care. But so many of human relations with animals are mediated through profit and product, rather than care. The new laws recognize that animals should not be humans’ property in the law. In practice they will defend the animals humans have chosen as pets, abandoning the animals victimized by industry. We can only hope that the interpretation of these laws and further activism will expand protection to animals who are still being brutalized.

Read More:

https://www.canberratimes.com.au/story/6407314/act-passes-australia-first-animal-sentience-laws/

by Dr. Kevin Boileau

In Santics v. Vancouver (City) Animal Control Officer, 2019 BCCA 294, The appellant’s dog was designated a dangerous dog after it seriously injured a person in a public park. The Provincial Court judge who heard the matter assumed the availability of conditional orders falling short of destruction in dangerous dog proceedings under s. 324.1 of the Vancouver Charter, but held that the lack of reasonable alternatives for the dog’s rehabilitation meant that there was no choice but to order destruction. The judge’s decision was upheld by the Supreme Court of British Columbia on appeal. The appellant appeals from the order of the Supreme Court. Held: Appeal dismissed. On the evidence, it was open to the Provincial Court judge to conclude that the appellant’s dog posed an unacceptable risk to the public and ought to be destroyed. Furthermore, on an application by an animal control officer to the Provincial Court for a destruction order pursuant to s. 324.1(10) of the Vancouver Charter or s. 49(10) of the Community Charter, the Provincial Court, upon finding that the dog is dangerous in that it poses an unacceptable risk to the public, does not have the jurisdiction to make a conditional order falling short of the dangerous dog’s destruction; the dog must be ordered to be destroyed. The Provincial Court does, however, have the jurisdiction to conclude that the dog does not pose an unacceptable risk to the public, in that the dog is not likely to kill or seriously injure in the future, whereupon the dog is to be returned to its owner.

The Honourable Mr. Justice Abrioux states as follows, in the court record:
I: INTRODUCTION
[1] This appeal marks the first opportunity for this court to substantively address the dangerous dog provisions of the Vancouver Charter, S.B.C. 1953, c. 55, and identical provisions contained in the Community Charter, S.B.C. 2003, c. 26.

[2] In an order dated January 10, 2019, the Supreme Court of British Columbia dismissed an appeal brought by the appellant, Ms. Susan Santics, from an order of the Provincial Court of British Columbia requiring the destruction of her dog. Ms. Santics appeals to this court from the order of the Supreme Court.

[3] This appeal concerns not only the fate of “Punky” — a four-year-old Australian cattle dog owned by Ms. Santics and which seriously injured a woman in a public park — but also raises questions as to the Provincial Court’s powers on an application for the destruction of a dangerous dog. In particular, it raises the question of whether s. 324.1(10) of the Vancouver Charter and s. 49(10) of the Community Charter confer jurisdiction on the Provincial Court to make conditional orders falling short of destruction.

[4] This appeal also raises the correctness of Capital Regional District v. Kuo, 2006 BCSC 1282 (“Kuo”). For 13 years, Kuo has been relied on by both the Provincial Court and the Supreme Court — the latter in its role as an appeal court — as the authority for the Provincial Court’s jurisdiction to make conditional orders falling short of destruction in dangerous dog proceedings: see, for example, Panton v. Central Okanagan (Regional District), 2016 BCSC 69.

[5] I would conclude as follows:

(a) in so far as Ms. Santics’ dog is concerned, the Supreme Court judge committed no reviewable error in dismissing the appeal from the Provincial Court’s order that the dog be destroyed;
(b) contrary to the reasoning in Kuo, once the Provincial Court has found that a dog is likely to kill or seriously injure within the meaning of the Vancouver Charter or the Community Charter, it does not have the jurisdiction to make orders — conditional or otherwise — save for that the dog in question be destroyed;
(c) notwithstanding (b), there may be circumstances in which a dog that satisfies the statutory definition of “dangerous dog” nonetheless does not pose an unacceptable risk to the public, in which event the Provincial Court must dismiss the destruction application and release the dog to its owner; and,
(d) while there may well be good policy reasons for recognizing conditional orders in certain situations, as legislation in some Canadian provinces has done, it is for the Legislature and not this court to determine the framework that ought to apply in British Columbia.
(e) I would accordingly dismiss the appeal.

There is more to the complete record, but let’s focus on the summary above, which demonstrates serious lack of due process and a serious lack of regard for the life of a dog. The Appellate decision on its face is violent and irrational because it won’t give the provincial court authority to weigh middle-ground options including rehabilitation, and transfer of custodianship out of the city. In the U.S. this could be viewed as a serious due process issue, especially because of the legal trend to recognize that domestic dogs have interests. Even the language of the vicious dog statute is suspect because one option is to “destroy” the dog. To destroy is something you do to things not living beings. Even death row human inmates are not destroyed, they are executed. Thus beyond the fact that this judge just overturned several years’ of common law, the actually vicious dog law would apparently be in conflict with the trend in the law to recognize interests if not some rights of domestic dogs.

Second, whatever harm happened was due to the negligence of this dog’s custodian and yet the Canadian court system chooses to make the dog responsible. This dog should never have been in the city. He is a cattle dog and should be out in the country. Currently he is being held in impound, which is further harm to him. The dog is a victim here, not a perpetrator.

Third, because this dog’s very life is at stake, the Appellate Court justice and the Provincial court erred in allowing the dog’s custodian to represent herself and her dog’s interest. At a very minimum this custodian should have been represented by counsel. The court should have also required that the dog be represented by separate legal counsel when his very liv eis at stake. Obviously, the court recognizes the need for some due process requirements in vicious dog adjudications. It seems logical that it would recognize the interests of the dog, especially in a capital case like this.

Fourth, the provincial court erred in not allowing the development of evidence that this dog could be rehabilitated. Now, the Appellate Court makes the specious argument that the dog has not been rehabilitated in its two years’ imprisonment, but this very imprisonment was caused by the government. Thus, the government cannot make the unpersuasive argument that the dog’s custodian took no measures to rehabilitate the dog while it has been imprisoned. There has been little to no evidence adduced about sending the dog out of the city, and into the hands of a certified sanctuary in North America, where the dog could be rehabilitated, placed in a new and safer environment away from the congestion of people in a city park. The Appellate Court has clearly erred in its conclusion that there is no evidence that the dog is an acceptable risk to the public. The Provincial Court makes the same error.

In short, this is a tragic case of A) a dog being in the wrong environment for its breed and temperament and B) needing a different sort of human custodian. Perhaps if Punky’s owner transferred his ownership to a rehabilitation expert, a sanctuary, or some other kind of certified organization that was far out of the jurisdiction and far away from the city, the court would find that this would insure an “acceptable level of risk to the public.”

If the Supreme Court of Canada hears this case, it ought to send it back to the provincial court with instructions that insure due process and prevent the further harm of the canine victim, Punky.